Starting from the pontificates of John XXIII and Paul VI, the Catholic Church has, with both sensitivity and differing cultural approaches, proposed the initiation and cultivation of a broad based "dialogue" with the "modern world". With John Paul II the call for this encounter has actually changed into a request for reconciliation, one which the Church itself is addressing to the world.
The object of this dialogue is made up of many themes. This article will focus on the dialogue concerning the current economic systems, characterized by liberal principles, and on the problems of the free market.
There were many steps needed to reach this point, and they were not always easy. And, in fact, even today it is not possible to say that everything is clear.
From the first great social encyclical, Rerum novarum, with which in 1891 Pope Leo XIII brought to the fore the questions raised in the social field by the new economic systems, to the Centesimus Annus of a century later, there has been a notable change in the attitude of the ecclesiastical magistero in relation to such problems.
If the Rerum novarum had a strong influence on the effects of the successive changes in the capitalist system (which owes its persistent success also to the capacity it has shown to correct and adapt itself to various situations, while communism has remained almost unaltered from its foundation to its collapse), in this century the dominant note of the social magistero can be seen as one of keeping its distance, along with pronouncing highly critical emphasis with regard to both the capitalist system and the collectivist system. This has resulted in a situation where the opposition to both systems is almost symmetrical.
In this period constant and vigorous emphasis has been given to the centrality of man, as both subject and object of all economic relationships, and to an insistence on the duty of solidarity (a principle which is moreover clear only in its meaning as being a dutiful attention towards the weakest subjects of society and towards the poorest peoples); this remains apart from the fact that the passage from admiral but generic statements to concrete situations has left lacunae which were difficult to fill. On the other hand, when attempts were made to fill such lacunae with practical suggestions of a technical and concrete nature, the risk deriving from the absence of adequate cultural interventions was felt.
One can bring to mind the attention which was persistently centered on the problems of work, as opposed to that which was, only in a subordinate way, given to those problems of the business enterprise (and adequate attention is still lacking today with regard to the problems of savings); the fact that a certain favor has been shown towards particular aspects of the procedures which deal with social assistance; the uncertainty demonstrated in the quest for utopian "third ways"; and the insistence on the idea of a link of necessary causality between the development of some countries and the underdevelopment of others.
In this way the "social doctrine" could not manage to offer a clear ethical guide to Catholic workers in the economic field (this might be a good point to mention the fact that these workers are no different from the non-believing workers when it comes to situations of people paying bribes and kickback).
It was only with the Centesimus annus, when the communist system had collapsed, that the market economy system was fully recognized and the contribution to the social progress of individual liberties in the economic field was acknowledged without reserve.
The capacity of taking on economic initiatives, in which the attitude of each man towards invention and creation is expressed, is recognized as the content of an inalienable right of the personality and, at the same time, is considered to be that "human capital" which today constitutes the main source of wealth in the economic process.
To this new vision, obviously facilitated by the historic failure of the socialist model, is owed the recognition of the positive results provided by the capitalist system (even though the documents of the Church prefer not to use the words "capitalist system" and insist on calling it "free-market economy"), as well as the recognition, explicit and unequivocal for the first time, of business and, more to the point, of profit, which appears as an absolutely innovative concept.
In this regard, it seems to me that, in line with this new way of evaluating economic reality, one might suggest that Christian reflection should also find other positive values in the logic governing the market system: that of the equality of "starting points", which is the very basis of competition; that of the fundamental value of competition and of "challenges", if understood in a correct way (which could be legitimized with the same metaphor which St. Paul used to indicate Christian life); and above all that of the value of risk. Economic initiative is inconceivable without the acceptance of risk connected to every business choice, but the theme of risk also constitutes one of the leit-motiv of the Christian proclamation: he who wishes to save his own life will lose it. (This important element of an ethic of generosity is expressed to great effect, as everyone knows, in the parable of the talents: a parable which is of value for all sectors of human experience, and which is applicable in a very precise way, even in its literal meaning, in the economic field). In this sense the category of economic activity could be appraised not only in an ethical context, but also in a context which is religious: enough to justify, I do not hesitate to assert, a conviction that there will be an assistance from Providence every time that commitment in economic activities is motivated by generosity.
However, the Church's recognition of the positive results of capitalism in the modern world obviously cannot be pushed as far as the acceptance, without reserve, of a theory which considers and justifies personal and selfish interest as the exclusive, or at least as the predominant, motivation of human action in the economic field.
A pragmatic view which places personal advantage at the base of every individual behavior - and which could go so far as to establish the homo oeconomicus as the founding element of every human discipline (Becker) - would be in total opposition to the evangelical message.
We feel that this truly seems to be the fundamental point: in the Catholic Church's conception, freedom of economic initiative is understood in a different key from the utilitarian one which today characterizes the predominant directions taken by economic theory. In other words, the Catholic magistero clearly states and proposes a concept of economic enterprise which we might define as "idealistic", from which derives the possibility of wedding the principle of freedom with that, repetitively emphasized, of solidarity. It is not to be ignored that one of the most convinced supporters of the ethical foundations of capitalism, Michael Novak, while he praises with enthusiasm and tends to appropriate the new propositions in favor of economic liberty contained in the pontifical document, declares moreover that the calls for solidarity (which might be accompanied by possible interventions of the political authority) are unacceptable and improper, without being aware of the fact that he is perverting the position of the Church with this interpretation.
The problem which presents itself at this point is therefore one of ascertaining the compatibility, or lack of it, between the affirmation of the free market and the call to the duty, both individual and collective, of pursuing a state of fairness. Such compatibility is to be shown, in the first instance, as being on the same moral plane as individual behaviors, since it is a question of verifying if the categorical imperative of efficiency, or in other words the obedience to the ever more stringent rules directed to the pursuit of profit, leaves sufficient liberty for the individual operators to make choices which have been inspired by generosity. But it is on the social plane and in the historical order that it is necessary to indicate the instruments - both those of a technical nature, entrusted to the research of economic science, and those of a juridical nature, which are subject to the decision of the political authorities - which can produce the link between the utilitarian motivation and that of fairness. Definitively speaking, it is a question of establishing if the rights of solidarity can find a position and can find satisfaction within the economic process, insofar as these rights are of the same nature, or whether they constitute values to be considered only in a successive phase, with the object of making necessary corrections in the system.
Therefore, this is the basic question to which we are all committed to find an answer; for it is evident that if we do not find an answer, all of the other statements which are currently being discussed in the Catholic environment would remain generic, and all of the reiterated calls for solidarity and for the so-called principle of subsidizing would risk being merely wishful thinking.
It seems to me that this risk is particularly serious in Italy today. If it is true, in fact, that the complexity of the constituent factors of the market economy has not so far allowed economic science to propose a unitarian pattern of development, it is equally true that in recent years we are observing, in our country, an attempt - supported by a part of the business world and by public opinion, and intermittently seconded also by the legislature - to imitate the anglo-saxon system, marked by an absorbing logic of the quest for profit, in the perspective of an even briefer time period. This attempt, apart from triggering acute processes of tension in the markets, robs the firms themselves of the breathing space necessary for setting up strategic programs.
Spaces for Personal Witness
Before I formulate any conclusive views with regard to the above mentioned questions, I cannot but express an evaluation, also based on my personal experience, of what both the room for freedom and the mechanics of the economic system currently in force leave to the responsibility and the ideal motivations of the individual operators.
If we look at the proof provided under the ethical profile of Italian Catholic businessmen in the last few decades, we must acknowledge that it has been somewhat disappointing; so much so that it prompts a doubtful response. Instead of encountering exemplary behaviors, there has even been reason to complain about the non-observance of those "minimal" ethical values which are rooted in the common conscience and are codified in the laws.
Most people have accepted the diffusion of illegal practice in the relationships that exist between business and politics as being normal, or at least inevitable. We must recognize with frankness and bitterness that even on the part of the Catholic world these practices do not arouse a prompt reaction and a strong move towards the rejection of such a situation
In spite of this, I am convinced that even the economic and financial sector, although characterized by a logic of ferocious competition, does not deprive the Christian worker of the essential space needed for bearing coherent and faithful witness. And in this space, which permits freedom of choice, the Christian faith can stimulate an increase of ideal and moral commitment which, in its most virtuous dimension, invariably expresses itself by defending the human values which are involved in any aspect of economic activity.
In this perspective the responsibility of those who must make their choices within the narrow margins of compatibility with the rules of efficiency, must be to maintain a commitment to respecting the various levels of human values: from the most well known and widely discussed ones concerning work and employment, to those, which so far Catholic thought has paid insufficient attention, of care for the small-scale saver. Another body of evidence by which the freedom of choices which effect important human values can be measured, is that of industrial crises.
Consistency in their behavior, if it is inspired by Christian principles, means that the businessman and the manager are required to act according to their conscience in the most varied of circumstances. Among the many which can be mentioned one can consider, as an example, that of maintaining moderation when faced with the temptation of excessive profit or of accepting compensation which will permit the acquisition of excessive wealth above and beyond just payment, or the refusal of every form of speculation (where, that is, the two elements which justify profit, i.e. work and risk, are lacking).
Also, on the plane of interpersonal relationships in the area of their own work, Christians too often cannot be distinguished from the others workers. Alongside the all too well known cases of class conflict, there exist equally serious cases of conflictual behavior within the classes, within groups and between individual and individual: interpersonal rivalries, even between Christians, dictated by ambition and the quest for power.
But I would like to repeat that, in my opinion, the specificity of Christian inspiration can take on its most important significance in the space allotted to the use of discretionary power, present in every economic choice, where the search for constructive solutions involves it even more in making commitments and taking risks.
This is an endless field of experience where the mark of Christian inspiration must always be perceptible as an invitation to courage and hope. Here - on the level of the individual, and sometimes in the dramatic secrecy of consciences - is where the most important meeting between Christianity and modern history takes place and here is where it will increasingly continue to do so.
Globalization of Markets and Bonds of Solidarity
However important may be the significance of the personal response of each of us to the call for solidarity, equally evident is the insufficiency, if not the marginality, of individual testimony with regard to the solution of the greatest problems connected to the process of the globalization of markets. In this regard I think that attention should above all be drawn to two aspects: on the one side, the need to safeguard values and goods which are of general consequence (insofar as they are not on the market and cannot therefore be purchased), on the other the protection to be provided for certain categories of subjects (from the workers to the consumers), when they find themselves in a position of weakness when encountering the system. The safeguarding of these goods and of these people can only be handled through a regulatory action on the part of the political authorities.
If the most extreme versions of neoclassical economic theory that find favor in certain capitalistic practices were to be followed, then, in order not to compromise the efficiency of the market, interventions on the part of the political authorities, directed to regulating business activity in the phase of the production of wealth, should be excluded. A ruling, directed to social re-equilibrium, would be admissible only in the subsequent phase of the redistribution of incomes (mainly by means of the tax structure) and in the choices relative to the allocation of public resources.
But by now one must recognize that it is difficult to sustain this assumption when faced with the proven incapacity of the market to confront and resolve some of the most important social problems of our time by itself: above all those of the social costs which the process, only just begun, of globalization (certainly beneficial in the long run) poses dramatically during this phase, given the situation of the enormous gap between the distribution of income and wealth between the various countries of the world: according to U.N. statistics, gathered in 1995, the distribution of income for the seven most industrialized countries was shown to have an average GDP of 25,830 dollars ($19,121 for Italy); for developing countries of 2,610 dollars down to a minimum of $1,000 for African countries.
Central among these problems is that of work, both because of the inequalities of competition deriving from the varying cost of labor, especially when this is associated with the lack of adequate measures for the protection of the dignity and security of the workers in certain countries, and because of the impossibility of stemming the powerful influx of immigrants into the labor force, unless one uses restrictive measures which are clamorously in contrast with the "sacred" principles of the free circulation of productive factors.
Under the first aspect it appears difficult to accept that the remedy for the extremely strong differences existing in the cost of labor, above all when such a phenomenon depends on the lack of protection of the workers, is the one suggested by a utilitarian market logic: leading to relocating production to places where labor costs less. The existence of this improper alternative alters, among other things, also the play of industrial relations.
Under the second aspect it is necessary to emphasize the dramatic cultural and civil repercussions, strong enough to endanger the very survival of national identities, which would derive from the lack of political regulation of the flow of immigrants (in Europe the Treaty of Schengen was the first attempt to formulate such a regulation).
But how, at this point, can one fail to say how important it is that when considering a subject such as this, those people who are believers should also clearly define, in the light of a critical evaluation of the reasons presented, their own attitude towards this problem? In fact, if the provision of assistance to the disinherited of the third world who are present in our country is greatly and prevalently the merit of the Catholic voluntary movement, so far there is a lack of a linear orientation of Catholic opinion to support the current attempts by political authorities to regulate, both in the sense of applying reasonable limits to, and in the sense of favoring the civil integration of, the chaotic and desperate floods of immigrants who in addition are the object of shameful speculation.
And, to go deeper into this problem which touches the fundamental theme of the rights of every human being to exist in conditions that are compatible with a respect for his dignity, how can one not express perplexity with regard to a culture, regrettably widespread among Catholics (as, for example, the divisions of opinions on the Moro case continue to reveal), according to which life is considered an absolute good, never to be sacrificed to any other good and value? Do not the Gospels tell the story of a Man who sacrificed His own life as an example?
On the other hand, the full awareness of the grave human costs, as well as the powerful and disruptive effects connected to the phenomenon of migration, cannot fail to re-propose the theme of birthrate in a dramatic way, particularly with regard to the poorest regions of the earth, which are not capable of insuring their own populations the possibility of work and survival. In fact the assertion of the defense of every human life from its beginning, that is from the moment of conception, as being inalienable, can hardly be said to imply that we are encouraging procreation when the new being which will come into this world will not be offered the conditions of life compatible to his dignity as a man.
Equally it is becoming increasingly clear that the exercise of economic activity comes up against an insurmountable barrier when attempting to consider certain essential goods (public properties) and protect and conserve them for the future, starting from natural resources and an environmental equilibrium. The protection of natural resources, limited in themselves, against the risk of indiscriminate exploitation, cannot certainly be insured by the free-market; it demands rulings of an administrative nature. Certain phenomena are also becoming evident in this field, for example changes in the climate (which today have assumed dramatic importance, but in future could assume apocalyptic proportions), due to delays in the adoption of measures for the limitation of productive activities which, as the last Tokyo Conference showed, continue to be hindered by the economic forces that have an interest in them.
Knowledge is another precious gift; it is one of the most important resources of an economy which is trying to compete in a total market, that is in a worldwide market.
Information is a value which conditions the financial markets, feeds industrial competition, modifies the strategies of important productive sectors, influences delicate political choices (for example in the military sector), and even constitutes the contractual object of great commercial transactions with third world or developing countries. If this is true, one must not only consider the problem of the simple efficient management of such goods in the perspective of mere utilitarianism, one must also realize the necessity of responding and applying remedies to the preliminary questions of the wider production and distribution of such goods in order to guarantee a better and perhaps more efficient utilization of them.
Among other things, for these new goods and for all the values so far mentioned, it might be useful to return to the classical teaching which, since it was directed to the better protection of the free exploitation of resources, did not exonerate us from the need to see the possible social, political and even demographic effects, in the conviction that from the practice of free economic enterprise there should derive the progress, not only material, of the greatest number of people.
In any case, it is obvious that on all the points indicated here the request for reconciliation which the Church addresses to the modern world finds itself facing a new and broader challenge, a terrain no longer limited to appealing to each individual's sense of morality but open to the urgent entreaties of a collective ethic which is both aware of and attentive to the values and goods of general import.
Our reflection on this point cannot but come to a problematical conclusion, and that means with an interrogative which involves us all, because it concerns the very juridical regime of our rights to freedom. Can the principle of solidarity be understood as a true juridical obligation of respect and no longer as a moral attitude of concern, with regard to goods and gifts of general import? And can it therefore interfere with the utilitarian practice of the rights of liberty - above all, but not only, in the economic field - as if solidarity, as a second nature, was another aspect of the utilitarian practice?
If one could answer this question positively, the dichotomy of freedom-authority could be re-proposed on a plane no longer of dialectical opposition but rather of innovative integration. It is not an exaggeration to maintain that an elaboration of this kind would be one of the most fecund contributions which Christian thought could offer to the world of the future.